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P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JESSICA JOY BROWN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43068
FREMONT COUNTY NO. CR 2014-683
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Jessica Joy Brown entered an Alford plea to aiding and abetting attempted
first degree murder, the district court sentenced her to fifteen years, with twelve and
one-half years fixed. Ms. Brown moved for reconsideration of her sentence under Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”). Following a hearing on Ms. Brown’s Rule 35 motion, the
district court reduced the fixed portion of her sentence to ten years. Ms. Brown now
appeals to this Court, contending that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
further reduce her sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On April 6, 2014, Ms. Brown’s stepfather Eric Norlen was shot twice by Jermaine
Wiley outside Mr. Norlen’s residence. (Presentence Investigation Report (PSI),1 p.4;
R., p.46.) Mr. Norlen survived the shooting. (PSI, p.4.)
Ms. Brown was charged with aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder
and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. (R., pp.46–47.) Ms. Brown pled guilty to
aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement with the
State. (Tr. Vol. I,2 p.6, L.18–p.7, L.20, p.22, L.16–p.23, L.6.)
At the entry of plea hearing, Ms. Brown admitted that she purchased ammunition
for Mr. Wiley, allowed Mr. Wiley to use her vehicle to drive to Mr. Norlen’s residence,
paid for a motel room for Mr. Wiley the night before the shooting, and directed Mr. Wiley
to the victim’s location. (Tr. Vol. I, p.23, Ls.14–p.26, L.6; R., p.46.) Ms. Brown’s
boyfriend Dramell Da-Shawn Jones introduced Ms. Brown to Mr. Wiley just one day
before the shooting. (PSI, pp.6–7; Mot. to Augment, Sealed Affidavit, p.8.) Mr. Jones
told Ms. Brown to drive Mr. Wiley to Idaho and follow all orders of Mr. Wiley as if he
were Mr. Jones. (PSI, pp.6–7; Mot. to Augment, Sealed Affidavit, p.8.) Ms. Brown
further explained that her understanding was that Mr. Wiley was going to intimidate, but
not physically harm Mr. Norlen, to help Ms. Brown get custody of her daughter, who was
living with Mr. Norlen and Ms. Brown’s mother. (Tr. Vol. I, p.25, Ls.17–22; PSI, p.5.)

Citations to the PSI refer to the 73-page electronic document titled “Confidential
Exhibits.”
2 There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the July 25,
2014, change of plea hearing and the June 9, 2015, Rule 35 motion hearing. The
second, cited as Volume II, contains the April 24, 2014, preliminary hearing and the
February 24, 2015, sentencing.
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Ms. Brown subsequently moved to withdraw her guilty plea and entered an
Alford3 plea, which was accepted by the district court. (R., pp.114–15.)
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the conspiracy charge
if Ms. Brown cooperated and substantially assisted the State with the prosecution of
Mr. Wiley. (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.23–25; Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.24–p.7, L.4.) At sentencing, the
State provided that Ms. Brown complied with the agreement by providing substantial
assistance. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.11–17.) The district court sentenced Ms. Brown to fifteen
years, with twelve and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.175–77.) The district court entered a
Commitment Order on February 24, 2015. (R., pp.175–77.)
Ms. Brown moved for reconsideration of her sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule
35. (R., pp.187–88.) She also filed a timely notice of appeal from the Commitment
Order. (R., pp.190–91.)
After a hearing on Ms. Brown’s Rule 35 motion, the district court granted her
motion in part by reducing the fixed portion of her sentence from twelve and one-half
years to ten years. (R., pp. 216–17, 219, 221–23; Tr. Vol. I, p.70, Ls.1–6.) That two and
one-half year reduction was then added to the indeterminate portion of Ms. Brown’s
sentence, so her total unified sentence remained at fifteen years. (R., pp.216–17;
Tr. Vol. I, p.70, Ls.1–6.) The district court entered an Amended Order of Commitment.
(R., pp.216–17.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when failed to further reduce the fixed portion
of Ms. Brown’s sentence at the Rule 35 hearing?

3

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Further Reduce The Fixed
Portion Of Ms. Brown’s Sentence At The Rule 35 Hearing
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Brown’s
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-4004, -306(1)
(maximum of fifteen years). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Ms. Brown “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho
457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3)
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
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“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903
(Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must
“consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the
reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The Court “conduct[s] an independent
review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276
(Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence
under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985).
“When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). In
this case, Ms. Brown provided a statement to the district court at the Rule 35 hearing.
She stated:
Honesty is something that requires courage and integrity, especially
when it re -- when it’s involved with something that you’re ashamed of,
and it’s something that I’ve struggled with for most of my life.
In this situation in particular, I lied for so long that I almost believed
myself. And the day that I was sentenced, the things that you and that Eric
had to say changed that. Throughout all of this, I’ve acted selfishly, from
the beginning to the end, saying and doing what I thought would get -would get me what I wanted or what -- what I thought would be best for
me.
Eric’s right. What he said on the day of my sentencing was -- it was
really accurate. It was painfully accurate. And he’s right. I should have
called him. And he’s right that I’ve been lying.
And I, alone, had the power to stop him from being shot and from
nearly dying, and I didn’t. And that’s something that I regret, like, sincerely.
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And I’m thankful that he’s alive and he’s there for my kids. My kids love
him.
And I’m thankful that he’s here today and he’s in their life. Because
they need him.
Eric and I have had our differences over the years, but he -- he
didn’t deserve any of this to happen to him. And I wish that I would have
done something to stop him and my family from having to go through any
of this.
Because of me, Eric’s life and the lives of our entire family will
never be the same again. At the beginning of this, I had myself convinced
that I was a victim in this crime, and now I can see how foolish that was
and that it’s really Eric and our entire family that are the victims because of
my lies and selfish actions.
I can’t keep doing the same things and expecting different results. I
know now that I should have been honest from the beginning, but I could
only think of myself. And so I lied to try and get what I wanted out of this
situation.
This time that I’ve had and everything that’s gone on has caused
me to take a long, hard look in the mirror, and I didn’t like who I saw
looking back at me. My actions have hurt a lot of people.
And I’m tired of lying and hurting and betraying the people that love
me, and I don’t want anyone else to get hurt because of my actions
anymore.
As much as I want to, I can’t change my past, but I do intend to
learn from it and have a better future. This is going to require me
maintaining a lifestyle with positive choices and actions.
And I’m hopeful today that you’re willing to reduce the fixed portion
of my sentence, which I feel will give me the opportunity to show progress
that my family wants to see.
And I’m -- I understand that I have a debt to pay to society and my
family, and I want to make good on that. I’m not asking you to reduce the
entirety of my sentence because I -- I -- but I do feel that I deserve to have
the opportunity to show the progress and to get into the programs that are
available to me and that -- that you’ve recommended to be rehabilitated
and to, hopefully, be more of a part of my children’s lives than I am right
now.
Right now, I talk to them on the phone twice a week, but that's
about as much as I can do, and I want to be there for them, and I want -- I
want to reestablish my family relationships and just fix the things that I’ve
broken. And I thank you for hearing this today and for allowing me to
address the Court with the truth.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.51, L.3–p.53, L.18.) As recognized by the district court, Ms. Brown’s
statement showed “significant growth” and “a much more appropriate level of contrition”
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than at sentencing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.64, Ls.11–15.) The district court also recognized that
Ms. Brown showed “a much higher level of introspection,” “growth,” and “accountability.”
(Tr. Vol. I, p.64, Ls.22–25.)
Upon further questioning by the district court, Ms. Brown explained that she
spent her time doing volunteer work, participating in church activities, and attending a
recovery program. She stated that she spent “a lot of time doing Bible study” and led a
Bible study group in jail. (Tr. Vol. I, p.53, Ls.22–24.) Ms. Brown also informed the district
court that she received a certificate for a weekly 12-step Addictive Recovery Program
through the Church of Latter-Day Saints. (Tr. Vol. I, p.54, Ls.11–13.) Due to issues
beyond her control, Ms. Brown had not been transferred to the women’s prison (where
she would have access to more programming), but she requested self-help books to
begin treatment on her own in jail. (Tr. Vol. I, p.53, L.24–p.54, L.2, p.54, L.24–p.56,
L.17.) Ms. Brown also explained that she cooperated with the State to the best of her
abilities. (Tr. Vol. I, p.57, Ls.8–11.)
After Mr. Brown’s statement and further argument by the parties, the district court
found that the “only difference between where we are today and where we were when
we did sentencing back in February is that you have really improved your attitude a
great deal.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.68, L.23–p.69, L.1.) The district court reduced the fixed portion
of Ms. Brown’s sentence by two and one-half years, but added that two and one-half
year reduction to the indeterminate portion of her sentence, so the total unified sentence
remained at fifteen years. (Tr. Vol. I, p.70, Ls.1–6.) The district court provided, “I don’t
think I’m lowering your sentence. I think I’m giving you the sentence that I originally
intended to give you but for the fact that . . . I wasn’t very impressed with your attitude”
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at sentencing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.71, Ls.4–8.) In other words, the district court explained that
the reduced sentence is the sentence “I would have given you if you had showed the
Court then what you’ve showed today.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.71, Ls.8–10.)
The district court’s decision to reduce Ms. Brown’s sentence, however, was
premised on its erroneous finding at sentencing. At sentencing, the district court
focused on a statement that it believed Ms. Brown made during the presentence
investigation: that Ms. Brown was “victimized by poor choices.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.55, L.15.)
The district court found this statement ironic because Ms. Brown was not the victim.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.55, Ls.15–19.) The district court explained that Ms. Brown’s stepfather, her
mother, her children, and, “to a certain degree,” Mr. Wiley were the parties victimized by
Ms. Brown’s “poor choices.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.55, L.18–p.56, L.8.)
Contrary to the district court’s belief, this victimization statement was never made
by Ms. Brown. In fact, Ms. Brown made the opposite statement during the presentence
investigation. She stated:
It was never my intention for anyone to be harmed, however I do
acknowledge my responsibility in this horrible crime. I’m truly and deeply
sorry to Eric and my mother, as well as my children for being victimized by
my poor choices. I’m also sorry to my entire family for the shame I have
brought to them.
(PSI, p.17 (emphasis added).) Similarly, Ms. Brown stated in the presentence
investigation she was “very guilty” and “ashamed” her “poor choices” negatively
impacted so many lives. (PSI, p.7.) Thus, in contrast with the district court’s
understanding at sentencing, Ms. Brown did not see herself as a victim. She recognized
the real victims of her criminal behavior.
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In light of this erroneous finding by the district court, Ms. Brown submits that the
district court abused its discretion at the Rule 35 hearing. The district court’s decision to
reduce her sentence was based on its perceived change in Ms. Brown’s attitude. If the
district court had the proper information before it—that Ms. Brown had always
expressed great remorse for her poor choices and fully acknowledged the real victims—
the district court may have further reduced her sentence. Additional information
provided at the Rule 35 hearing, such as Ms. Brown’s participation in positive activities
in jail and her cooperation with the State,4 warranted a reduction in her sentence.
Further, Ms. Brown may have demonstrated an even greater level of acceptance of
responsibility and remorse at the Rule 35 hearing, which also would have warranted a
reduction in her sentence, but this finding is unknown due to the district court’s
erroneous belief that Ms. Brown saw herself as the only victim up until the Rule 35
hearing. Therefore, Ms. Brown requests that the Amended Order of Commitment be
vacated to allow for a new hearing on Ms. Brown’s Rule 35 motion with the correct
information before the district court.

At the Rule 35 hearing, the district court was “disappointed” by the fact that Ms. Brown
was unable to produce concrete evidence of her cooperation with the State. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.41, Ls.7–24, p.68, Ls.3–22.) The district court explained that concrete evidence
“would have certainly given me a strong reason to consider further leniency for your
sentence.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.68, Ls.16–18.) But, as Ms. Brown’s counsel explained at the
Rule 35 hearing, concrete evidence was impossible for Ms. Brown to produce as the
“higher-ups” told Ms. Brown’s counsel that they would “not provide anything in writing”
or “respond to a subpoena.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.42, Ls.9–12.)

4
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Brown respectfully requests that the Amended Order of Commitment be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2015.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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JESSICA JOY BROWN
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